

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Claiming reward in the future (cont.)

The Gemara continues to discuss the claim of reward of the other nations and whether they receive reward for fulfillment of the Noahide laws.

The claim of the nations that the Jews did not fulfill the Torah leads the Gemara to a discussion of the dependence of the world on Torah study.

The story of Hashem's offer to give the nations one last chance to fulfill a mitzvah is recorded.

A second context of R' Yitzchok's teaching that Hashem will only laugh on that day is presented.

The Gemara unsuccessfully challenges the premise that Hashem does not rejoice in this world.

The Gemara searches for the source that Hashem has not laughed since the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash.

Different suggestions are offered to explain what Hashem does during the fourth hour of the day now that He no longer rejoices.

2) Torah study

R' Levi describes the consequence for one who stops studying Torah.

Reish Lakish emphasizes the value of studying Torah at night.

A second version of this teaching is presented.

Two interpretations are offered for the pasuk that equates mankind and fish.

The second interpretation is explained in two ways. ■

REVIEW and Remember

1. What kind of reward is given to those who fulfill the seven Noahide laws?

2. What is the easy mitzvah Hashem will give to nations to fulfill?

3. Why will converts not be accepted during the time of Moshiach?

4. What is the reward for those who engage in Torah study at night?

Today's Daf Digest is dedicated
By Rabbi and Mrs. Makhloof Suissa
In loving memory of their mother
מרת אסתר גיטל בת ר' יעקב, ע"ה

Distinctive INSIGHT

Sukkah – the “easy mitzvah”

מצוה קלה יש לי וסוכה שמה

The Gemara presents a dramatic depiction of the Day of Judgment and the desperate attempt of the nations of the world to argue their cause. At one point, the nations of the world beg to be given a final chance to be given the Torah and to fulfill its mitzvos. Hashem ridicules them for too little of an effort too late, as “only one who prepared before Shabbos will have to eat on Shabbos.” Nevertheless, Hashem responded, “I have a mitzvah which is easy, and it is called Sukkah,” says Hashem. “Go and do it now.”

Maharsha explains the reason Hashem chose to test the nations particularly with the mitzvah of Sukkah. A sukkah is a temporary structure. This world, also, also represents a temporary existence, in that it serves solely as a passageway to the next world. One's stay in this world should serve as a preparation for the next world, and Hashem uses the mitzvah of Sukkah to symbolize and indicate to the nations of the world that they should have fulfilled the mitzvos earlier, in this world, which is a temporary dwelling, just like a sukkah.

Toras Chaim notes that there are other mitzvos other than Sukkah, whose fulfillment can be described as being “easy.” However, the request of the nations of the world was specifically that they wanted to be given an opportunity to fulfill a mitzvah in order to earn reward. Hashem therefore selected a mitzvah whose performance is equal to all the mitzvos. And although there are other mitzvos which are categorized as being equal to all other mitzvos, such as Shabbos, milah and tzitzis, these each have an element of difficulty associated with them. Shabbos results in a perceived loss of income as one has to be idle from his livelihood for an entire day each week. Tzitzis is expensive because of the special techeiles dye, and milah is difficult to perform due to the pain involved for the child.

The Gemara questions this magnanimous proposal which Hashem offered to the nations of the world, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught that mitzvos and their reward may only be performed in this world, and not in the next. The Gemara answers that, nevertheless, Hashem did not want to contend with the nations, so He gave them another chance, which they failed miserably. Maharsha notes that the Gemara already mentioned that giv-

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HALACHAH Highlight

A father authorizing his son as a slaughterer

אומרים לפניו רבונו של עולם כלום יש אב שמעיד על בנו

They will say before him, Master of the Universe! Is there a father who is believed to testify about his son?

Rema¹ writes that our custom is that a person does not slaughter animals unless he has authorization (קבלה) from a Torah scholar. Torah scholars do not authorize people to slaughter unless they demonstrate proficiency in the laws and have received training in the practical aspects of slaughtering animals. Poskim have raised the question of whether a father is permitted to authorize his son to slaughter animals. The basis of the question is from our Gemara. The Gemara relates that the nations of the world will ask Hashem for evidence to the fact that the Jews fulfilled the Torah and Hashem will offer to serve as a witness. The nations will reject Hashem as a witness since a father is not permitted to testify on behalf of his son and Hashem referred to us as His children when He declared (Shemos 4:22) בני בכורי ישראל – My son, My firstborn – Yisroel.

Teshuvos Halachos Ketanos² was asked the question of whether a father may authorize his son to slaughter and he responded that there is no question about the matter that it is permitted. When it comes to prohibited matters (דבר איסור) everyone is considered reliable. Once the Torah

(Insight...continued from page 1)

ing the nations another chance was a violation of the rule of “only one who prepared before Shabbos will have to eat on Shabbos,” but yet the Gemara obviously realized that the chance to do another mitzvah was an extended favor. Still, our Gemara here cites the statement of R’ Yehoshua b. Levi not to question how the nations could perform mitzvos, but rather how could they earn reward for mitzvos in the end of days. ■

assigns credibility to a single witness, even women or relatives are fit to testify and the authorization to slaughter is merely a form of testimony. Teshuvos Teshuras Shai³ also writes that a father may authorize his son to slaughter. The reason it is permitted has nothing to do with whether a father has credibility as a single witness or not; the reason is that the authorization is nothing more than a disclosure (גילוי מילתא) that someone is qualified to slaughter. There is nothing in halacha that prevents a father from disclosing something about his son and therefore there is no problem for a father to authorize his son to slaughter. This approach also resolves the potential question from our Gemara. The reason Hashem was disqualified was that He wanted to give testimony but since in our case it is disclosure rather than testimony that is needed, it is permitted. ■

1. רמ"א יו"ד סי' א סעי' א'
2. שו"ת הלכות קטנות ח"א סי' ל.
3. שו"ת תשורת ש"י סי' תקי"ב. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

The Greater Level

גדול המצווה ועושה ממי שאינו מצווה ועושה

Why is one who is commanded and fulfills his obligation greater than one not commanded who does the same action? Rav Shmuel Zev Halevi Roth, zt"l, explained this with a story: “Once, when the Arugas Habosem, zt"l, the famous posek, was visiting the Shinover Rebbe, zt"l, the latter complained that he simply could not give over Torah in public. Since the Shinover Rebbe was greater than the Arugas Habosem, this caused him to think

that perhaps he too should not deliver Torah to the masses. ‘If your honor can’t disseminate Torah, what can we possibly say?’

“But the Shinover Rebbe disagreed with this logic. ‘You need to teach the people under your jurisdiction to prevent them from deviating in even the slightest way from the Shulchan Aruch. Of course it is your obligation to lecture the public at every opportunity. But my job is to lead chassidim to a higher spiritual level, and not always is it best for me to speak publicly...’

“Through this story we can explain why one who is commanded and acts is superior. When one is commanded he is required to act, no matter his feelings. But one who is not obligated is

often better off refraining from doing what he is not obliged to do—perhaps he would be better off if he abstained.”¹

Rav Shlomo of Sadigura, zt"l, explained this differently, “One who acts when not obligated is a volunteer. Naturally, when the going gets rough, he bails out and does not exert himself to fulfill the mitzvah properly. He reasons that since he is not obligated, even his half-hearted efforts are sufficient. But one who acts because he is commanded knows that he must do his very best to fulfill the mitzvah in exactly the right way, since he is duty-bound to do the mitzvah thoroughly.”² ■

1. דברי שמואל, ע' קס"ה
2. חיי שלמה, ע' רמ"ט ■