



Today's Daf Digest is dedicated  
 In loving memory of **שרגא פייוול דוד בן קמואל**  
 The Abramowitz family

## OVERVIEW of the Daf

### 1) Jumping dogs and goats (cont.)

A contradictory Baraisa regarding a jumping dog or goat is cited.

R' Pappa resolves the contradiction.

This resolution is unsuccessfully challenged.

### 2) Fire

R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish dispute whether liability for fire is because it is similar to shooting an arrow or because the fire is one's property.

Each Amora explains why he rejects the other's position.

A number of different unsuccessful challenges to Reish Lakish's position are presented.

Rava states that there is a verse and Baraisa that supports R' Yochanan's position. ■

## REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the point of dispute between R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish?  
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2. Is it permitted for a shopkeeper to place a lamp outside of his store?  
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3. Is one liable if he ignites a pile of grain and the fire kills a bound up goat?  
\_\_\_\_\_
4. What verse supports R' Yochanan's view that liability for fire is because it is similar to one's arrows?  
\_\_\_\_\_

Today's Daf Digest is dedicated  
 By the Geller family  
 In loving memory of their grandfather  
**ר' יהודה לייב בן ר' יהושע, ע"ה**

## Distinctive INSIGHT

*Understanding "fire" as the actions of man—  
 אשו משום חציו*

הכלב שנטל אתמר רבי יוחנן אמר אשו משום חציו

Several approaches are offered to explain the view of R' Yochanan who says that a fire ignited by a person is considered as if the man has shot an arrow (אשו משום חציו). This means that when a person lights a fire, the damage it causes is an extension of "man" doing damage.

Maharsha (to Sanhedrin 77a, to Tosafos סוף ד"ה) says that the law of fire being as shooting an arrow applies only when the fire travels by itself, without the assistance of any wind. In this case, the fire is attributed completely to the person who lit it. If the movement of the fire is driven by the wind, even R' Yochanan considers the liability of fire to be **ממונו**—property causing damage. Chazon Ish explains that if the wind was blowing when the person lit the fire, we also consider it as if the person lit the fire and handed it over to an agent. Any subsequent movement of the fire, even due to the wind, is "man" doing damage. If the fire was lit when there was no wind, and afterwards the wind started, this is the case where the fire is **ממונו**.

Nimukei Yosef notes that according to R' Yochanan a fire is considered as a man's action as it continues to spread, even after it is ignited. He asks why it is permitted to light a candle on Friday afternoon and allow it to remain lit as Shabbos begins. Why do we not say that the person who lit it is considered as igniting a flame on Shabbos as the flame continues to be lit? He answers that the analogy of comparing a fire to shooting an arrow must be explained correctly. When a person shoots an arrow, we do not say that he is continually propelling the arrow. Rather, his entire input is included totally at the moment the arrow is launched.

If we viewed the ongoing flight of the arrow as his actions unfolding, he would arguably be exempt from damages caused as the arrow lands, for at that moment the arrow's strike is something that is no longer able to be controlled. A person cannot be held accountable for a situation which is not within his ability to control. We see, therefore, that the entire act is contained within the first moment the arrow is released, and at that moment the

# HALACHAH Highlight

## The use of a timer on Shabbos

ר' יוחנן אמר אשו משום חציו

R' Yochanan says that liability for fire is that it is similar to shooting an arrow

Nimukei Yosef<sup>1</sup> asks that according to R' Yochanan who asserts that liability for lighting a fire is because it is similar to shooting an arrow (אשו משום חציו) it should be prohibited to light a candle before Shabbos that will continue to burn into Shabbos. If the continuous burning of the flame is attributed back to the person who lit the flame, the continuous burning of the candle should constitute a violation of lighting a fire on Shabbos. He answers that the principle that fire is similar to shooting an arrow means that whatever results from the original flame is attributed back to the one who lit the fire but it does not mean that we look at the flame as if it is being ignited at this moment.

Based on this explanation there are authorities who maintain that it is permitted to set a timer on Erev Shabbos to turn on an appliance on Shabbos. The reason is that according to Nimukei Yosef everything is determined by the moment the person triggers the process; therefore, as long as the timer is set before Shabbos all subsequent actions that result are attributed back to that moment the timer was set before Shabbos and is thus permitted. Teshuvos Machaneh Chaim<sup>2</sup> disagrees with the application of Nimukei Yosef to the case of a

(Insight. Continued from page 1)

shooting of the arrow is his responsibility. Similarly, the lighting of a fire or candle on Friday night is complete and final with its being ignited. The continued flame is attributed to the person who lit it, but the person's action of lighting is finished before Shabbos begins. ■

timer. Nimukei Yosef discusses a case where the act that began before Shabbos continues into Shabbos (The candle that was lit before Shabbos continues to burn on Shabbos) but the case of the timer involves a case where a new melachah begins on Shabbos (the timer turns on a light that was off before Shabbos) and the leniency of Nimukei Yosef does not apply when a new melachah begins on Shabbos.

Rav Moshe Feinstein<sup>3</sup> also wrote that the position of Nimukei Yosef is not relevant to the question of using timers on Shabbos and although it could be argued that there is no halachic basis to prohibit the use of timers on Shabbos, nevertheless, he opposed using timers on Shabbos. Since the use of timers could permit almost any melachah on Shabbos it would lead to a complete disgrace (ולזול) of Shabbos and there is no doubt, he asserts, that Chazal would have prohibited the use of timers the same way they prohibited asking a gentile to perform a melachah for a Jew on Shabbos. The only use of a timer that he permits is for lights since there were many leniencies in place related to the use of lights on Shabbos. ■

1. נמוקי יוסף י (בדפי הרי"ף)
2. שו"ת מחנה חיים ה"ג אר"ח סי' כ"ב
3. שו"ת אג"מ אר"ח ה"ד סי' ס' ■

# STORIES Off the Daf

## A secondary force

ר"י אמר משום חציו

A certain woman gave birth to a baby boy on Shabbos in a neighborhood that had no eiruv. They had to find a non-Jew willing to carry the baby to the shul where the bris would be performed. In addition, the mohel did not wish to leave his special scalpel in the shul, so they placed the carefully wrapped knife in the bundled up baby blankets.

When they arrived, the knife was nowhere to be found among the baby's

things. Eventually, the implement turned up just outside the shul, in a public area. Although it had been located, they still had a problem: how could it be brought into the shul? One person in attendance suddenly had a brilliant idea. "There happens to be a very powerful magnet right here in the shul. Why not use it to draw the fallen knife into the building?"

When someone asked their local rav, he permitted this. "This can be no more than a grama, so why not allow it on Shabbos. Especially for the sake of a mitzvah."

When this question was asked of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, zt"l, he was not so quick to permit the act. "In Bava

Kama 22 we find that the owner of an object that fell off a roof due to the wind must pay the damages. Although the Ra'ah holds like Reish Lakish that one is obligated because it is his money, Tosefos rules like Rav Yochanan that one is obligated because it is as if he shot an arrow from a bow.

"Clearly, according to Tosefos, using a magnet despite the fact that there is a secondary force in them is still a violation on Shabbos. Although the Chazon Ish, zt"l, rules categorically like the Ra'ah, I do not understand what prompted him to do so... Surely no one is qualified to permit this with certainty!"<sup>1</sup> ■

שו"ת הר צבי אר"ח א' סימן קל"ב