

## OVERVIEW of the Daf

### 1) Using consecrated funds to pay for an obligatory Korban (cont.)

The Gemara relates an incident that illustrates the principle that once a person makes a commitment it is binding and he cannot subsequently put a condition onto that commitment.

Another version of this teaching is presented with Ravina teaching instead of R' Yochanan.

### 2) Leaning on a Korban Shelamim on Yom Tov

A Baraisa was cited before R' Yitzchak bar Abba that teaches that an obligatory Korban Olah requires leaning.

R' Yitzchak bar Abba, who assumes that the dispute in our Mishnah relates to the question of whether obligatory Shelamim korbanos require leaning, explains that the Baraisa reflects Beis Shammai rather than Beis Hillel.

The Gemara unsuccessfully challenges R' Yitzchak bar Abba's understanding of Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai.

A story is recorded that relates to the dispute between Hillel the Elder and Shammai the Elder regarding offering a Korban Olah on Yom Tov. At the conclusion of the story, halacha was decided in accordance with Beis Hillel's position.

Another incident involving a student of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel is recorded. Abaye concludes from this story that one should respond to criticism in a measured fashion.

### 3) Bringing voluntary offerings on Yom Tov

A Baraisa records two versions of the arguments between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the permissibility to offer a Korban Olah on Yom Tov.

The Gemara explains that the difference between the two versions is whether voluntary offerings may be brought on Yom Tov.

R' Huna clarifies that the opinion that holds that one is not permitted to offer voluntary offerings on Yom Tov maintains that it is a Biblical restriction rather than a Rabbinic restriction.

The Gemara asks, according to the opinion that maintains that it is prohibited to offer voluntary offerings on Yom Tov, what should be done in the event that one slaughtered an animal as a voluntary offering?

Rava suggests that the blood should be applied in order to permit the meat for consumption, whereas Rabbah bar R' Huna maintains that the blood should be applied in order to permit offering the sacrificial parts that night.

The difference between their opinions is highlighted.

The Gemara begins to challenge the opinion of Rabbah bar R' Huna. ■

## Distinctive INSIGHT

### Conditional statements

טעמא דאמר הבו ליה ולינסיב. אבל אי אמר לינסיב והבו ליה אי נסיב שקיל, ואי לא נסיב לא שקיל

The Gemara discusses variations of a statement made by a person on his deathbed. In one case, he declares, "Give four hundred zuz to this man, and he shall marry my daughter." Here, Rav Pappa rules that the money should be given to the recipient unconditionally, and he may marry the daughter if he chooses to do so. If the man reverse the clauses and states, "This person shall marry my daughter, and he shall receive four hundred zuz," then the halacha is that the recipient must marry the daughter, and only then would he receive the money. What is the difference between the two statements, and what does the halacha detect as the contrast?

Rashi and Tosafos explain that when the giver first declares, "Give the money to the man," he intends it as an unconditional gift. His later comment about marrying his daughter was an afterthought, unconnected to his gift. If, however, he begins with the marriage to his daughter, this is meant as a pre-condition to receiving the money.

Rif (Bava Basra 66b) explains that where he mentions the money first, we see that the giver means to offer the receiver both the money and his daughter as gifts for the taking. The receiver may do as he wishes, but there is no condition assumed by the giver. Where the giver mentions the marriage first, we understand that he wants the marriage to be a pre-condition for the offer of the money, which will be a gift.

Ba'al Hamaor explains that if the clause of giving the

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## REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the pasuk that indicates that an obligatory Korban Olah requires leaning?  
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2. Why did Hillel the Elder lie?  
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3. What is Abaye's lesson concerning responding to rebuke?  
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4. Are voluntary offerings brought on Yom Tov?  
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# HALACHAH Highlight

## Lying

תנו רבנן מעשה בהלל הזקן שהביא עולתו לעזרה... אמר להם נקבה היא ולזבחי שלמים הבאתיה

*The Rabbis taught: There was once an incident with Hillel the Elder who brought his [Korban] Olah to the Azarah to lean on it [and offer it] on Yom Tov... He responded that it was a female and it was brought to be offered as a [Korban] Shelamim.*

**R**abbeinu Yehudah HaChasid<sup>1</sup> in Sefer Chasidim limits the Gemara's statement that allows a person to deviate from the truth for the sake of peace<sup>2</sup>. If a person does not want to lend money out of fear that the borrower will not pay back the loan, if in fact he has money, it is prohibited to lie, even for the sake of peace, and claim to not have money. The reason explains Sefer Chasidim, is that the Gemara's allowance to lie applies only to issues related to the past but not to issues related to the present or future. Rav Reuven Margolies<sup>3</sup>, the author of the commentary M'kor Chessed to Sefer Chasidim, questions this ruling from our Gemara. Our Gemara relates that Hillel the Elder lied about the gender of the animal, which related to the present rather than the past.

The Ben Ish Chai<sup>4</sup> offers a resolution to this question based on the commentary of the Gaon Chida to Sefer Chasidim. Gaon Chida writes<sup>5</sup> that the reason one is permitted

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money is stated first, it is not binding as a condition, because it does not conform to the technical requirement of "the condition of the sons of Gad and Reuven," from where we learn the rules of conditions. Many Rishonim question the basis of the Ba'al Hamaor, because these constraints are lifted for a deathly-ill person. ■

to lie about their Torah knowledge<sup>6</sup>, even though it is relevant to the present rather than the past, is because it relates to the trait of humility, and behaving humbly is even more significant than peace. Accordingly, suggests Ben Ish Chai, one could explain that Hillel lied, not merely to maintain peace between himself and the students of Shammai, but to act humbly as well. This explanation is supported by Rashi's comment to the Gemara. Rashi writes<sup>7</sup>, "Out of his (Hillel's) exceeding humility he deviated from the truth to maintain peace." We see clearly from Rashi's comment that it was not only for the sake of peace that Hillel lied but it was also because it allowed him to behave in a humble fashion. ■

1. ספר חסידים סי' תכ"ו ומובא דבריו במג"א סי' קנ"ו סק"ב
2. גמ' יבמות ס"ה
3. מקור חסד שם אות ב'
4. שו"ת רב פעלים ח"מ ח"ג סי' א'
5. ברית עולם לספר חסידים ע"ש לשונו במש"כ
6. גמ' בבא מציעא כג
7. ד"ה ולזבחי שלמים ■

# STORIES Off the Daf

## The value of silence

שוב מעשה בתלמיד אחד מתלמידי ב"ה שהביא עולתו לעזרה לסמוך עליה מצאו תלמיד אחד מתלמידי ב"ש אמר לו מה זה סמיכה אמר לו מה זה שתיקה שתקו בניזיפה והלך לו אמר אביי הלכך האי צורבא מרבנן דאמר ליה חבריה מלתא לא להדר ליה מלתא

**O**n today's daf, we find an anecdote about a disciple of Beis Shammai who tried to prevent a disciple of Beis Hillel from performing semichah on an animal to be brought as a burnt-offering on Yom Tov. When the talmid of Beis Shammai asked curtly, "Mah zu semichah?" ["Explain this semichah?], the talmid of Beis Hillel responded in kind, "Mah zu shesikah?" ["Explain the value

of silence!"]

When the Imrei Emes of Ger, זת"ל, returned from his first voyage to Eretz Yisroel, the Rav of Kalish, זת"ל, tried to elicit some details about his journey. The Imrei Emes, however, did not seem to be willing to engage in conversation.

"Nu?" prodded the Kalisher Rav. "How does the Rebbe feel after his visit to the Holy Land? Don't Chazal say that even the air of Eretz Yisroel makes one wise?"

The Imrei Emes nodded. "Yes, it's true," he answered. "And Chazal also said: the protective fence for wisdom...is silence!"

This can also mean that silence is sometimes the best defense, because with it, one can avoid an argument altogether.

A delegation of Sefardic rabbis once came to visit the Mahari"l Diskin, זת"ל, the illustrious Rav of Brisk.

As soon as they arrived, the group of sages began to weave a number of intricate arguments about certain Torah subjects, while the Mahari"l simply sat quietly and did not participate.

Eventually they tired of this, and decided to take their leave. As they left, the members of the delegation shook their heads in dismay and lamented to one another, "What a pity—to see such a great scholar who has gotten old and forgotten his learning!"

What the group didn't realize was that the gaon of Brisk was as much a master of silence as he was a master of Torah! ■

