

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Throwing the blood of a piggul korban (cont.)

The Gemara continues to challenge R' Abba's assertion that piggul does not take effect until the blood is thrown on the altar.

Ravina unsuccessfully challenges R' Abba's position that piggul does not take effect until the blood is thrown on the altar.

The Gemara begins to seek proof to R' Gidal's first teaching that throwing blood of a pigul korban does not remove the me'ilah prohibition from kodshei kodoshim.

After citing proof from the latter part of a Baraisa the Gemara wonders whether one can deduce backwards that the earlier part of the Baraisa also constitutes proof to R' Gidal's ruling.

The difference between blood left past its time and blood of piggul is explained.

Another attempt to find support for R' Gidal's ruling is presented.

2) Permissibility for kohanim

Bar Kappara begins to seek clarification of R' Yehoshua's mention of "permissibility" for kohanim.

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the point of dispute between R' Yehudah and Chachamim concerning piggul?

2. Is piggul subject to the me'ilah prohibition?

3. Why is הלנה different than מחשבה?

4. When is a korban disqualified in a way that had a moment of permissibility for kohanim?

Distinctive INSIGHT

The moment when the meat is permitted for the kohanim

היתר שחיטה שנינו

In the Mishnah, R' Yehoshua taught a rule that once kodshei kodoshim arrived at a moment when they become permitted for kohanim, me'ilah no longer applies, even if the offering subsequently becomes disqualified. The Gemara probes to understand what is meant that "there was a moment when it was permitted for kohanim." Bar Kappara told Bar Pedas to research the subject so that they would be able to discuss it in the Beis Midrash the next day. The issue was whether the animal's being permitted at the moment of shechita is enough, or whether it is necessary that the animal be permitted for the kohanim to eat, which means that it be permitted also at least until the moment of collecting of the blood. This suggestion uses the rule "all that is fit to be sprinkled is considered as if it is already sprinkled," and the meat is immediately ruled to be permitted. A third possibility was also introduced for consideration and that is that the animal be permitted for eating, meaning that not only does the blood have to be ready to be sprinkled, but it must also actually be sprinkled properly in order for the offering to be considered ready to be eaten.

Sefer Mikdash Dovid explains the various sides of this inquiry. All agree that we must perform a service whereby the meat becomes permitted to the kohanim. The first opinion, that this refers to the shechita, feels that it is only the shechita that is a service with the meat of the animal, as opposed to collecting the blood and sprinkling it, which are services done with the blood. The second opinion holds that permission to eat the meat is directly a function of collecting the blood in order to sprinkle it. Because collecting the blood is an inherent part of the later eating of the meat, this is also considered a service of the meat. However, this view agrees that the actual sprinkling of the blood is a blood service, and not one of the meat.

The third view is that although the sprinkling of the blood is not done with the meat, this is still an essential service of all offerings which is done before the meat is eaten. Therefore, it is only after the sprinkling of the blood that the meat is considered to be permitted for the kohanim, and at which time the me'ilah ceases.

Tosafos questions how can we understand the possibil-

HALACHAH Highlight

Giving an excuse to reverse something's status

הלנה דקעביד בידים

Leaving the blood past its time that is done with his hands.

Shulchan Aruch¹ rules that if a woman tells her husband that she is t'meiah and then she declares that she is t'horah she is not believed. However, if she gives an explanation why she falsely declared that she was t'meiah she is believed to now declare that she is t'horah. For example, if she explains that she made the false declaration because was unable to be with her husband her explanation is accepted. In the event that she wore the garments that she normally wears while she is a niddah rather than merely declared that she was t'meiah she is not believed even if she offers a reasonable explanation for why she made a false declaration. The reason for the distinction between a declaration and an action is that it is not uncommon for people to say false things out of embarrassment or for some other compelling reason but it is uncommon for people to perform actions that are not true in order to avoid discomfort. As such it is assumed that her action represented her true state of being and she is no longer believed to change her status.

Da'as Torah² questions what qualifies as an action that cannot be reversed. More specifically, if a woman refuses to do something which indicates that she is a niddah, is that

(Insight...continued from page 1)

ity that we say that the intent of the Mishnah is that the meat is permitted for the kohanim with the shechita? At that point the meat is clearly not yet permitted to be eaten. Tosafos explains that perhaps this refers to the law that after the shechita, all services must be performed by kohanim, and not the owners. We can therefore say that once the shechita takes place, it is in the hands of the kohanim to finish the job and bring it to the point that it may be eaten. In this sense, it is with the shechita that the offering is no longer “קדשי ה'” and me'ilah no longer applies. ■

considered an action that irreversibly indicates that she is a niddah? For example, if she did not allow her husband to hand something to her can she later give an excuse for her behavior so that she should not be considered a niddah? He then took note of the fact that our Gemara considers the act of leaving blood out to be an action even though in reality it involves an action that was not performed and for that reason it is treated more severely than piggul. However, this does not definitively answer this question since it may be that this inaction is more severe than a mere thought but it may still be possible to reverse it with a valid excuse. ■

1. שו"ע יו"ד סי' קפ"ה סעי' ג'.

2. דעת תורה יו"ד סי' א' ס"ק כ"ד ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Human Nature

דמייתי לדי פיגול

Today's daf discusses the issue of piggul.

Rav Aharon Leib Steinman, zt"l, once discussed the terrible scourge of sin'as chinam in a moving manner. Speaking in a pained tone of voice, he said, “It is sad that when a Jew wants to expand his apartment, his neighbor—even if the construction doesn't affect his apartment in the slightest—will often find an ‘underground’ way to stop construction. Such a person often won't even allow his neighbor to put

up a sukkah for seven days a year. But why should he care? In many situations the protestors' apartment is in the north and the construction is in the south. Although there is no earthly reason why such construction should annoy them, they still protest. This is especially despicable when they oppose the building of a shul, claiming that this will cause the price of their apartments to drop.

“Firstly, this is definitely false. Quite the contrary, in a religious neighborhood, building a shul can increase the value of apartments in the vicinity. But the most important reason why such conflict is wrong is more basic: why should they care? Why not rejoice in your neighbor's good fortune in-

stead of complaining? But what can we do; human nature is such that we tend to resent the success of others and it is hard to be giving.

“This explains why we find in Avos that one of the ten miracles in the Beis HaMikdash was that the kohanim didn't think thoughts that would render sacrifices piggul. Why is this a miracle? Clearly the kohen did not profit by invalidating the sacrifice of another Jew! This is one of the miracles because the nature of people is to be mean-spirited and act out of spite. Even in the holiest place on Earth, it required a miracle to protect people's sacrifices from being ruined because of innate bad middos!”¹ ■

1. מאחורי הפרגוד, ע' 243-244

