

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) The effectiveness of throwing the blood according to R' Akiva (cont.)

R' Assi challenges R' Yochanan's assertion that the throwing of blood must take effect upon something for it to have any significance.

R' Assi's position is unsuccessfully challenged.

R' Pappa asserts that R' Akiva's ruling is limited to meat that was taken out of the azarah and does not include blood that was taken out of the azarah.

A Baraisa is cited in support of this qualification.

2) Zerikah of a Chatas

R' Elazar asserts that R' Akiva's proof is limited to where both Chataos were slaughtered at the same time but does not apply when they are slaughtered one after the other.

A Baraisa is cited that supports this assertion.

Reish Lakish in the name of R' Oshaya rejects the logic of R' Akiva's response to the student in the Baraisa.

R' Yochanan defends R' Akiva's response and his response leaves Reish Lakish silent.

3) MISHNAH: The Mishnah discusses the effect that throwing blood of a korban has with regard to different prohibitions.

4) Clarifying the Mishnah

The Gemara infers from the Mishnah that after zerikah the meat is not subject to me'ilah but this implies that it is prohibited for benefit. The reason the Mishnah is phrased in this manner is explained.

The latter part of the Mishnah is also clarified. ■

הדרן עלך קדשי קדשים

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is R' Pappa's qualification to R' Akiva's ruling?
2. Is zerikah effective for meat of a korban that went out of the azarah?
3. Why did R' Yochanan call Reish Lakish a child?
4. Explain what the Mishnah means when it says ובקדשים קלים כולהו להחמיר

Distinctive INSIGHT

Designating something that is going to be destroyed
אלא דקתני על האבוד ועל השרוף קשיא, אמר רבא אימא על העומד לאיבוד ועל העומד לשרוף

In the Mishnah on 6b, R' Akiva said that the sprinkling blood can release me'ilah for an offering that was removed from the Mikdash. Later, R' Yochanan said that R' Akiva's statement was said only in regard to where the animal was partially taken out of the courtyard of the Mikdash, but if the animal was fully removed, even R' Akiva would agree that the sprinkling of its blood is not valid and me'ilah would not be suspended.

According to Rashi, at this point in the discussion, R' Asi is returning to R' Akiva's earlier statement, and he disagrees and cites a Baraisa to show that the statement of R' Akiva was said even where the entire animal was removed. The Baraisa states that a piggul intent can apply even if it is directed to limbs which are either lost or burned. R' Asi notes that if a piggul intent can be directed upon limbs that are lost or destroyed, which are not present at all, we would expect that when an animal is completely removed from the courtyard of the Mikdash that the sprinkling of its blood should take effect and release the me'ilah.

In response to this inquiry, Rava explains that the Baraisa was not referring to meat that was actually lost or destroyed. Rather, the lesson is not that an intention of piggul at the moment the blood is sprinkled may be registered on meat of an offering that was actually lost or destroyed, but rather that piggul applies when the intent was registered regarding something that is in front of us now, although it may turn out that that particular piece of meat became lost or destroyed. The point is that we do not say that the piggul is nullified when the piece which had the invalid thought upon it was lost. If, however, the meat was lost or destroyed, it could be that piggul cannot be directed toward it, just as R' Akiva said in regard to me'ilah not being able to be released if the entire animal is removed from the Mikdash.

Tosafos learns that the Baraisa brought by R' Asi is not being brought as a challenge against R' Yochanan's earlier statement regarding part or all of an offering which was removed from the Mikdash. Rather, the Gemara is pursuing what it perceives to be a contradiction between two statements of R' Asi. One statement is the one R' Asi cites from the

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HALACHAH Highlight

The meat of kodshei kodoshim after the blood was applied to the altar

אמאי הא ממונא דכהן הוא

Why, isn't it the property of the kohen

The Mishnah taught that once the blood of kodshei kodoshim was properly applied to the altar the meat of the korban is no longer subject to the prohibition of me'ilah. The Gemara infers from the fact that the Mishnah didn't declare that the meat is permitted that it is only the me'ilah prohibition that no longer applies but there remains a prohibition restricting kohanim from eating the meat. This inference is challenged since after the throwing of the blood the meat of the kodshai kodoshim is the property of the kohanim. What then is the restriction that prevents kohanim from eating meat that is their property?

Later authorities¹ wonder why the Gemara accepts the assertion that the meat is permitted as soon as the blood is properly applied to the altar. The truth is that the meat may not be eaten until the sacrificial parts are burned on the altar. The Gemara in Pesachim (59b) derives this from the sequence of pesukim (Vayikra 7:31) that first mentions burning the sacrificial parts and then mentions that the kohanim are given the leftovers. Accordingly, the Mishnah's statement that once the blood of the kodshei kodoshim is applied to the altar it is no longer subject to me'ilah but remains prohibited until the sacrificial parts

(Insight...continued from page 1)

Baraisa, that piggul may be directed toward meat that does not exist because it was lost or destroyed. The other statement is his acceptance of R' Zeira's teaching that piggul may not be declared upon blood which was spilled, because it is as if it no longer exists. Rava resolves this issue by noting that the Beriasa cited by R' Asi did not mean to say that piggul may apply to meat that is actually lost or destroyed, but only that if meat was separated at the time of sprinkling of the blood, and that piece was later lost or ruined, the piggul intent upon it is valid, and the offering is disqualified. ■

are burned makes sense so what is the intent of the Gemara's question? Sefas Emes² also wonders why the Gemara challenges the inference from the Mishnah from the fact that the animal is the property of the kohen when the Gemara should have mentioned that there is a mitzvah to eat the meat of the korban. Sefas Emes answers that the Gemara's inference was not focused on whether the meat of the korban is permitted since in fact before the burning of the sacrificial parts it is prohibited to eat. The Gemara's focus was on the prohibition from benefit. The Mishnah implied that once the blood is applied the me'ilah prohibition does not apply but it remains prohibited for benefit. The implication that it remains prohibited for benefit troubles the Gemara since at that point the meat belongs to the kohanim and other than the restriction against eating it the korban should be permitted for benefit. ■

1. עי' אור שמח מעילה פ"ב ה"א ועולת שלמה בתוס' ד"ה והא בא"ד לאחר.
2. שפת אמת ד"ה מעילה. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

The Yenuka

קצצתיהון דרגלוהי דינוקא

Many people believe that their shidduch will be one hundred percent perfect—a mirror image of themselves, in fact. Naturally, someone with this outlook will reject any offers since every proposal appears less than perfect in his eyes.

When the Chazon Ish, zt"l, was confronted with just such a bochur who had run through many offers, the gadol asked someone close to this "exceptional learner with sterling middos" to suggest a girl with very obvious drawbacks. The person whom the Chazon Ish asked to propose the match naturally balked, but the Chazon Ish insisted. "No, go tell him now. Tell

him that I proposed the match."

Shortly thereafter, the bochur became engaged to one of the excellent—though not perfect—shidduchim that had been proposed to him all the while. As the Chazon Ish had known, the moment that he heard that the gadol haddor had suggested a girl with little to recommend her, it punctured his inflated ego and he began to be more reasonable!¹

One question many wonder about is marrying an older girl. Many people believe that a boy should not marry anyone older. But as the Ne'imos HaChaim points out, there is a compelling argument against this logic. "In Me'ilah 7 we find that Rav Yochanan refers to Reish Lakish as yenuka, the Aramaic word for a child or youngster. Now we know that Reish Lakish married Rav Yochanan's sister. Since we find in Kiddushin 31 that Rav

Yochanan's father died before he was born and his mother when he was born, it is obvious that Rav Yochanan's sister was older than Rav Yochanan himself. It follows that Reish Lakish married an older woman!

Interestingly, when the Chofetz Chaim, zt"l, came home from learning he found his mother in tears. When he asked what was bothering her, she explained that his step-father insisted that the Chofetz Chaim marry his step-sister, who was ten years older than he. The step-father had threatened that if she did not make sure the marriage took place he would divorce her.²

To her surprise, the Chofetz Chaim instantly agreed to marry her!³ ■

1. מאחורי הפרגוד, עי' 333
2. נעימות החיים, עי' צ"א
3. מאחורי הפרגוד, עי' 144 ■