

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) R' Shimon's position (cont.)

The Gemara concludes the second and then presents a third challenge to Rabbah's assertion that according to R' Shimon there is a difference between a change of holiness and a change of owner.

The implication of Rabbah's explanation that animal korbanos are always damaged by incorrect intent faces a number of unsuccessful challenges.

Rava offers another resolution to the contradiction between the two rulings of R' Shimon.

This explanation is unsuccessfully challenged based on the wording of the Baraisa.

A second unsuccessful challenge to Rava's explanation is recorded.

It is noted that R' Acha the son of Rava disagrees and maintains that a chattas brought for another violation invalidates the korban.

R' Ashi suggests a third resolution to the contradiction between the two rulings of R' Shimon.

This explanation is unsuccessfully challenged.

The Gemara explains why each of the Amoraim rejected one another's resolution.

The Gemara relates that although Rabbah and Rava had clear positions on the effect of improper intent, R' Hoshaya was uncertain about the matter. ■

REVIEW and Remember

1. Where are kodoshim kalim slaughtered?

2. Do people take notice of the gender of an animal?

3. What is derived from the phrase זאת תורת המנחה

4. How do we know that the term שלמים refers to the Korban Shelamim rather than peace?

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מרת איטא בת חיים וחנה ע"ה
Mrs. Edith Levee

Distinctive INSIGHT

Placement in a particular utensil does not change the mincha

כיון דאמר ר' ש"א אף ידי נדרו יצא אלמא קביעותא דמנא ולא כלום הוא

The Gemara noted what seemed to be an inconsistency in the opinion of R' Shimon. In one Baraisa, we find that R' Shimon holds that if a mincha is offered "not for its sake" the mincha is nevertheless valid, and it also functions to have its owner fulfill his obligation. Yet, in a second Baraisa, we find the view of R' Shimon who explains the verse (Vayikra 6:10) that describes a mincha as "kodosh kodoshim, as a chattas and as an asham." He explains that a mincha of a sinner is like a chattas, in that if it is offered "not for its sake" it is disqualified. Any other mincha has the law of an asham, in that if it is brought "not for its sake" it is valid, but, just like an asham, it does not allow its owner to fulfill his obligation. This is inconsistent with the earlier version of R' Shimon's view, that a mincha which is brought "not for its sake" is valid and even allows its owner to fulfill his obligation.

Rabbah resolves these two versions of R' Shimon's opinion. When R' Shimon said in the first Baraisa that the mincha is valid and its owner also fulfills his obligation, it was because when he brought a pan-mincha (מחבת), even if he declares it to be a deep-pan offering, "its actions demonstrate" that he does not mean to change the status of the mincha. The procedure for each mincha is different, so the actions of the kohen as he places the minchah in a pan indicate his true intent more than his words when he says that he declares the mincha to be a different kind of minchah.. However, in the second Baraisa, we are dealing with a situation where the actions of the kohen do not indicate that his words are inconsistent with his actions, and his statement to offer the mincha "not for its sake" are therefore taken seriously. In this case, the mincha is valid, but it does not allow its owner to fulfill his obligation.

This answer of Rabbah assumes that when someone commits to bring a particular mincha, if his procedural actions are different than his commitment, we say that his actions are mistaken. The Gemara clarifies that the opinion of R' Shimon actually is that if, for example, someone pledges to bring a pan-mincha (מחבת), even if he places it into a deep pan, the placement into the wrong utensil is not significant, and his original pledge is binding, and he fulfills his duty to bring a pan-offering. This is why R'

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HALACHAH Highlight

Fried Menachos

האומר הרי עלי במחבת והביא במרחשת

Someone who declared, it is incumbent upon me to offer a machavas and he offered a marcheshes

The Gemara quotes a Mishnah (102b) that teaches that one who vows to offer a *Machavas Mincha* but offers a *Marcheshes Mincha* or the reverse has not fulfilled his vow although the Mincha is valid. R' Shimon adopts a more lenient perspective and asserts that he has fulfilled his vow as well since the type of utensil used to prepare the Mincha is not significant. *Sefer Minchas Avrohom*¹ asks why according to R' Shimon the owner is credited with having fulfilled his vow when, in fact, he did not fulfill his vow. His vowed to bring a particular type of korban and instead brought another variety of korban. Seemingly it is no different than one who vows to offer a *Shelamim* and offers in its place an *Olah*. Although the korban may be valid the owner certainly did not fulfill his vow. How then is this case different?

Sefer Minchas Avrohom answers that the *Machavas Mincha* and the *Marcheshes Mincha* are two varieties of fried *Menachos*. This is in contrast with the *Ma'afeh Tanur* which is a baked Mincha or the *Minchas Soles* which is a mincha offered from plain flour. Although for matters involving a change of designation (שינוי קודש) the *Machavas* and

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Shimon was able to say that the action is disregarded when it is inconsistent with the original declaration.

Tosafos (ד"ה אלמא) adds that even though the owner fulfills his pan-offering mincha commitment when he brings it in a deep pan, he should bring an additional mincha in a regular pan to fulfill his commitment properly, as he originally spoke.

The *Achronim* discuss whether the opinion of R' Shimon is only to validate a pan-mincha placed in a deep pan, where the difference is only which utensil is used, or if it is true regarding other exchanges of one mincha for another. ■

Marcheshes are considered two different *korbanos* for the purpose of fulfilling one's vow they are considered to be one variety, i.e. a fried Mincha. R' Shimon maintains that one does not obligate himself to bring a specific variety of a fried Mincha, all he does is obligate himself to bring a fried Mincha. The only essential difference between them is the utensil that is used to prepare it but that has no bearing on its essential general character of being a fried Mincha. For this reason when one vows to bring a *Machavas* and offers in its place a *Marcheshes* his vow is fulfilled. It is only when the flour is placed in the utensil to make a *Machavas* does it acquire its subcategory designation as a *Machavas* and from that point forward it may not be changed to a *Marcheshes*. ■

1. מנחת אברהם לסוגייתינו. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Actions Speak for Themselves

"מעשיה מוכיחים עליה..."

Rav Simchah Bunim Lieberman, zt"l, taught on today's daf. "In *Menachos 3* the gemara continues to explain the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that in certain circumstances a korban minchah—unlike ordinary sacrifices—discharge one's obligation even if he brought them having in mind a different type of minchah. Despite thoughts or even a verbal declaration, his words are meaningless since, when it comes to *menachos*, actions speak for themselves.

Rav Lieberman continued, "This teaches that no Jew can be totally dis-

tanced from Hashem. Whatever he may have done, the fact that he has a bris is an indelible action that declares his Jewishness."¹

A certain doctor called Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, shlit"a, with a fascinating question. He explained that he was about to operate on a new immigrant to Israel who was definitely Jewish but did not have a bris. His parents had been very liberal and although they loved the land, they did not approve of the "blemish" of making a bris. "Halachically, can I make him a bris during the main procedure without his approval ahead of time?" asked the surgeon.

Rav Zilberstein explained that this was only permitted if he was not planning to arrange a bris. "Also, you must

first do the bris, since the other operation will place him in the category of a sick person who may not be circumcised until he is well."

Despite the immense risk, the doctor decided to circumcise his amiable patient.

When the patient awoke and the doctor explained what he had done, the immigrant reacting in an amazing manner. "I must say that although I have never seriously entertained having a bris, now that it has been done I feel much more love for God and a powerful desire to fulfill mitzvos." He added, "I also feel overpowered with gratitude towards the kind doctor who enabled me to feel all this!"² ■

1. בצילה דמיהמנותא, מסעי תשס"ה, עי"ד

2. ברכי נפשי, ח"א, עי קצ"א ■