

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah begins with a disagreement about the effect of a piggul intent for only one of the permitters of a Mincha. Two additional cases in which R' Meir and Chachamim disagree are presented.

2) Clarifying the dispute

Rav asserts that the dispute is limited to where the kometz was put on the altar in silence and the frankincense was put on with piggul intent.

Shmuel maintains that they disagree even when the kometz was put on the altar with piggul intent and the frankincense was put on the altar in silence.

R' Acha bar R' Huna unsuccessfully challenges Rav's position.

Another challenge to Rav's explanation is presented.

Rava defends Rav's explanation.

R' Ashi challenges Rava's explanation and offers an alternative resolution to the challenge to Rav.

This explanation is successfully challenged.

3) Effecting piggul when there are many sets of blood applications

The Gemara questions how according to R' Meir it is possible to effect piggul when there are multiple applications if after the first application with piggul intent the blood is disqualified and no longer capable of effecting piggul.

Rabbah and Rava offer different resolutions to this challenge.

The Gemara digresses to reconcile the Beraisos that record a different number of applications for the Yom Kippur service.

4) Piggul

The Gemara inquires whether it is possible to effect piggul if one has piggul intent while transporting the minchah.

R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree whether transporting the kometz is similar to taking the kometz or burning the kometz.

R' Yochanan's opinion is challenged.

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Distinctive INSIGHT

Subsequent actions are an extension of the original mind set

שכל העושה על דעת הראשונה הוא עושה וכו'

The Mishnah discusses the case of a minchah that has more than one permitter, where the kohen who was officiating had improper intent of piggul while performing one service but not the other. R' Meir holds that if piggul intent was expressed only during the taking of the kometz, or only when the levonah was collected, the law of piggul applies. Although the piggul intent was only present during part of the "taking of the permitter," the law of piggul applies, and one would be liable for kareis if he would eat from this minchah. Chachamim contend that piggul only applies if the improper intent is maintained throughout the process of the entire permitter, which comprises the kometz and the levonah. In the case of a minchah of a sinner, where there is no levonah, Chachamim agree that piggul applies where the improper intent was expressed during the kometz alone, as it alone is the entire permitter.

Rav explains that the disagreement in the Mishnah applies where the kohen first took the kemitzah and burned it without saying anything, but when he took the levonah he expressed piggul intent. However, if the kohen expressed piggul intent while handling the kometz, and he was silent for the levonah, all opinions, even Chachamim, agree that the stated piggul of the kometz is understood to have continued as the levonah was collected and burned, as we have a rule that "the continued actions are done with the mind set that was set at the beginning." The silence during the levonah is seen as a form of acquiescence to the kohen's original intent expressed during the service of the kometz.

Shmuel disagrees with Rav, and he understands that Chachamim disagree with R' Meir in all cases.

Or Zarua (Hilchos Yibbum #611) asks why the halacha uses a rule to assume that the particular intent of a kohen as he began the service continued to be the same as he proceeded. Why don't we simply ask the kohen what he had in mind when he did the levonah service?

He answers that the significance of what he did is not a function of what he actually had in mind, but rather how the sages interpret and understand his actions. Even if he might have changed his mind set, if his actions are seen through the prism of halacha to be an extension of his original actions, and where the kometz was expressly taken with an improper intent, the levonah service would automatically be a case of piggul.

After proposing the same question of Or Zarua, Sfias Emes writes that we do not actually assume that we know that his original mind set continued unchanged. Rather, Rav and Shmuel disagree whether we have a firm framework within which to interpret his subsequent actions. ■

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the point of dispute among Rav and Shmuel?

2. What are the three sets of blood applications for the bull and goat of Yom Kippur?

3. Explain Rabbah's principle of לפלוגי מרצי.

4. What is the point of dispute between R' Chisda, R' Hamnuna and R' Sheishes?

HALACHAH Highlight

Treating the hide for the sake of the mitzvah

מחלוקת שנתן את הקומץ בשתיקה ואת הלבונה במחשבה

The disagreement is when the kometz was placed in silence and the frankincense with piggul intent

Rav and Shmuel disagree about the scope of the dispute between R' Meir and Chachamim in a case where one had piggul intent while burning the kometz but not the frankincense or while burning the frankincense but not while burning the kometz. According to Rav the dispute is limited to where the first act was done in silence and the explicit piggul intent was present for the second act. If, however, the first act was performed with piggul intent and the second act was done in silence all opinions would agree that the korban is piggul because we assume that a person's initial mindset continues through his subsequent acts (כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה). Shmuel disagrees and maintains that R' Meir and Chachamim disagree even when the first act was performed with piggul intent because he rejects the principle that a person's initial mindset continues through his subsequent acts.

It is necessary for one to treat hide that will be used for retzuos for the sake of the mitzvah¹. The first stage involves placing the hide into water which readies it for the next stage of soaking the hide in lime. It happened once that a person had the intent while putting the hide into the water that he was doing so for the sake of the mitzvah but when he moved the hide to the lime he did not have any intent and the question was whether the hide may be used for retzuos. Rav Shlomo Kluger² noted that the issue seems to be subject to a debate between Taz and Noda B'yehudah. Ac-

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Rava defends R' Yochanan's position.

Abaye unsuccessfully challenges Rava's defense of R' Yochanan.

R' Shimi bar Ashi also unsuccessfully challenges Rava's explanation.

Reish Lakish's position is successfully challenged.

5) Burning small parts at a time

The Gemara presents a three-way dispute regarding the effect of piggul intent for small pieces of the kometz at a time until the entire amount was burned.

An explanation for the basis of this dispute is offered.

This explanation is rejected.

An alternative explanation of the dispute is suggested. ■

According to Taz as long as the hide was initially placed in the water for the sake of the mitzvah it is sufficient whereas according to Noda B'yehudah the hide is invalid. Rav Kluger then wrote that in his opinion the hide may be used based on the principle that we assume a person's initial mindset continues through his subsequent acts. Teshuvos Imrei Kohen³ questions this approach since it is Rav who subscribes to this principle and according to the Gemara's conclusion Rav's position was rejected. He answers that it may be that the Gemara's rejection of Rav's position is limited to our Gemara which discusses an initial piggul intent. When a person has a sinful thought we do not automatically assume that he remained with that mindset. On the other hand, when it comes to an initial intent to perform a mitzvah it may be that all opinions would agree that his initial mindset continues into the next act. ■

1. שוייע אוי"ח סיי לייב סעי ח'.

2. שו"ת האלף לך שלמה או"ח סיי ל"א.

3. שו"ת אמרי כהן ח"א סיי כ"ח. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

The King's Command

כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה

A certain man received a royal order to build a palace to exact specifications. On each wall or other segment of the structure the person in charge of building wrote the king's name so it would be obvious to all that it was built at his own command.

This midrash is a parable to help explain the numerous times that we find it stated in Parshas Pikudei that Moshe did, "as Hashem commanded."¹ Yet Rav Shach, ז"ל, wonders how one relates to the other. "After all, Moshe merely recorded that it was done due to Hashem's command. On the surface this is not like the actual writing on the structure which is recognizable and

leaves an indelible impression on the craftsman's work."

He answered this question with a statement brought on today's daf. "The halachah is that the intentions that a person had when he undertook an action are considered to carry all the way through the accomplishment of the deed. One who began a mitzvah with a certain thought is considered to have had that thought throughout his work. For example, a sofer who writes merely needs to say in the beginning that he is writing the tefillin for the sake of the holiness of tefillin in order that everything that he does afterward will be considered as if it was done with the holiness of tefillin in mind."

Rav Shach added a caveat, "But that is only if nothing interrupts his work. If another intention interposes itself within his work, he must make a new declaration to

reaffirm his original intent. This is why one can never be satisfied with merely declaring his intentions in avodas Hashem. Since we all have nisyonos, we must often renew our original intentions!"

Rav Shach concluded, "Now we can understand the correlation between the parable and the Mishkan. In order for the Mishkan to be a fitting vessel for the revelation of Hashem's presence, Moshe did every action with express intent to fulfill Hashem's command. Since every human being has nisyonos it was imperative for Moshe to restate his intentions again and again. This is like the servant of the king who wrote on every door or window that it was the king's. The lesson from this is that emunah and recognition of Hashem should be reaffirmed with every step we take."² ■

1. ויקרא רבה, א' ז'.

2. מחשבת מוסר, תזריע. ■