



OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Clarifying R' Yosi's position (cont.)

The Gemara successfully challenges R' Huna's position that according to R' Yosi if one has piggul intent for the right leg the left leg is also piggul and he explains this with a pasuk as well as a logical explanation for this ruling.

Two additional successful challenges to R' Huna's position about this are recorded.

R' Yochanan offers an alternative explanation of R' Yosi's position.

R' Yochanan asked whether piggul intent for one type of loaf from a Todah renders the others piggul as well and whether piggul intent for one type of baked Mincha renders the other types piggul.

R' Tachlifa of the West cited a Baraisa that indicates that this case is subject to the dispute between R' Yosi and Chachamim.

2) Piggul

A Baraisa teaches that piggul intent while slaughtering and throwing the blood can combine.

There is a disagreement whether the same halacha applies for receiving and transporting blood.

The premise that different services can be combined to make piggul is challenged.

Rava resolves this by noting that there is a dispute between Rebbi and Rabanan about this point.

Abaye challenges this interpretation.

Rava bar R' Chanan challenges Abaye's understanding which leads them into a discussion about this matter.

3) MISHNAH: The Mishnah continues the discussion of the two Shavuos loaves and the two columns of the lechem hapanim.

4) Clarifying the dispute in the Mishnah

R' Elazar asserts that the dispute in the Mishnah is limited to where the loaf became tamei before throwing the blood but if this occurred after the throwing of the blood all opinions would agree that the tamei one must be burned and the tahor one may be consumed.

R' Pappa explains the point of dispute between R' Yehudah and Chachamim. ■

Today's Daf Digest is dedicated
 By Dr. and Mrs. Justin Gordon
 In memory of their father
 ר' יחיאל בן ר' יהודה אביגדור, ע"ה

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 The family of
 מרת חנה בת ר' דוד, ע"ה רובין
 Mrs. Ann Ruben o.b.m.

Distinctive INSIGHT

Does piggul effects items which "have no permitter"?

"אלו דברים שאין חייבין עליהן משום פיגול הקומץ והלבונה והקטורת ומנחת כהנים ומנחת נסכים וכו'"

Rashi (Zevachim 42b, ד"ה אלו דברים) explains that when we say that piggul does not apply to an item which has no permitter, this means that there is no kareis for someone who eats from an item where a piggul intent was present. This implies, however, that there still is a prohibition associated with such an item, and it would be disqualified, and one who eats from it would be liable for lashes. Rambam concurs with this approach, as he writes (Hilchos P'sulei HaMukdashim 18:7) that one who eats a permitting item is not liable for kareis, because the law of piggul does not apply to this extent, but the intent of piggul does cause the offering to become disqualified, and one would be liable for lashes if he would eat these invalid sanctified items.

Tosafos in Zevachim (23b) writes that piggul intent has no effect upon items such as a kometz of flour, levonah or ketores, and they do not even become disqualified. Tosafos cites a Gemara (Zevachim 14a) which presents the view of R' Shimon who says that items which are offered in the Sanctuary are not eligible for piggul, because the law of piggul is written in the law of shelamim, and, as such, only applies to cases which are comparable to a shelamim. This is, in fact, the reason Chachamim exclude items which have no permitter from the law of piggul (see Zevachim 28a). There, the Gemara goes as far as to say that items which are offered in the Sanctuary do not even become disqualified if piggul intent was expressed, but the conclusion of the Gemara is that these items do become disqualified, but due to a kal vachomer, which is a different reason. Items where that kal vachomer do not apply such as those listed in our Mishnah, would remain unaffected by piggul intent, because they are not similar to shelamim in this regard.

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REVIEW and Remember

1. What is R' Meir's position regarding מפלגין בחצי מתיר?
2. What items are not subject to piggul?
3. Does piggul intent for receiving the blood and transporting the blood combine?
4. What is the point of dispute between R' Yehudah and Chachamim?

HALACHAH Highlight

Is there a prohibition to cook half an olive's volume of meat and milk together?

השוחט את הכבש לאכל חצי זית מחלה זו וכו'

One who slaughters a lamb with the intent to consume half an olive's volume from this loaf etc.

Pri Megadim¹ wonders whether the prohibition of חצי שיעור –half a measure – applies to the prohibition against cooking meat and milk together. The Gemara (Yoma 74a) explains that when it comes to eating prohibited foods the principle of חצי שיעור applies since the half an olive's volume that was consumed can be combined with another half an olive's volume. There are two ways to understand the mechanics of this principle. One approach is that the principle is based on the concern that after eating one half olive's volume of the prohibited food he may eat another half olive's volume and combined he ate the full measure of the prohibited food. Another approach is that when consuming a half olive's volume it could have combined with another half olive's volume at that moment constituting the full volume of prohibited food. According to the first approach that the concern is combining two different acts it seems that we would not combine two different acts of cooking since each act of cooking always remains separate and distinct. According to the second approach, however, that the concern is that in the moment one may add more volume and consequently transgress the prohibition it seems that the same concern applies when cooking meat and milk together.

Teshuvos Nefesh Chayah² cites our Gemara as proof that we do not combine prohibitions in such a manner. The Gemara

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Mishne l'Melech (to Rambam, *ibid.*) writes that we have a disagreement between Rambam and Tosafos in this regard. Rambam holds that these items become disqualified with piggul intent, and one who eats them receives lashes. Tosafos holds that piggul intent has no effect upon them, and they are not disqualified. He adds that Tosafos would hold that intent to partake of these items outside their prescribed place also does not invalidate them, because we cannot have intent of beyond space limits be more severe than intent for eating beyond time constraints.

Keren Orah disagrees with the assessment of Mishne l'Melech. He says that Tosafos agrees that intent for piggul or for beyond the space constraints of the minchah cause the minchah and its kometz to be disqualified. Tosafos was only referring to the minchah of a Kohen or of nesachim, which are completely burned and have no permitter at all. These are totally unlike shelamim, and do not become disqualified with piggul intent. ■

addresses the case of one who slaughters one of the sheep brought on Shavuot with the intent to consume a half olive's volume of one of the loaves the next day and then he slaughters the second sheep with the intent to consume a half olive's volume of the second loaf the next day. The Gemara rules that these two thoughts do not combine to render the loaves *pigul* and the reason is that we do not combine different items to generate transgressions. It is only for prohibitions that relate to eating that combine since the process of eating involves combining different bites together into a single unit. ■

1. פמ"ג פתיחה לה' בשר וחלב אות ג'.
2. שו"ת נפש חיה יו"ד סי' י"ב. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

The Spoiled Dish

"פיגול..."

Rav Yerucham Levovitz, zt"l, imparts an important concept for understanding korbanos. "The main element of a sacrifice is the willingness with which it is brought. One's good intentions and sincere desire to do Hashem's will with the sacrifice is what determines whether the sacrifice will discharge his obligation or not."¹

In light of this it obvious why piggul is completely unacceptable. Thinking that one will do the opposite of Hashem's stated instructions for the korban creates an

insurmountable blemish in the sacrifice. The intentions of the one doing the avodah are the main fulfillment of Hashem's will. If they are done on condition of violating His will, this invalidates the sacrifice.

We can understand why intention is so essential in light of the following parable of the Chida, zt"l. "A certain man attended a magnificent feast where the most expensive food was served. Two platters of the same scrumptious dish were brought before him, both steaming hot. A mouth-watering aroma wafted forth which demanded immediate attention.

"But when this man sampled both platters, he was astounded to find that there was a very big difference between the

two. One of the dishes was spiced just right and tasted exactly as it smelled. While the second dish appeared just as savory, it had not been seasoned and tasted bland. After eating one bite, the man knew that it was not worth eating and only took from the spiced dish."

The Chida brings this example to illustrate the difference between a spiritual endeavor undertaken with the correct kavannah and another that was not. But when the person's intentions are not just "bland" but stand in contradiction to Hashem's will, it can be compared to adding a vile ingredient to an otherwise savory dish. Although it cannot be perceived by looking at it, the additive makes the food unfit for human consumption. ■

1. דעת תורה, צו, ע' קע"ו. ■