



OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) **MISHNAH:** The Mishnah presents different views of which offerings are acceptable even if they are brought not for their own sake.

2) Clarifying the Mishnah

The Gemara explains the meaning of the language of the Mishnah.

Ravina and R' Pappa discuss the issue of offerings offered not for their own sake (שלא לשמן).

3) Korbanos offered without specific intent

A source that offerings offered without specific intent are acceptable is cited.

This source is rejected in favor of another source.

This source is also rejected for another source.

Another source is presented and rejected.

A final source is cited that demonstrates that an offering brought without specific intent is acceptable.

4) A גט written without specific intent

The source that a גט written without specific intent is invalid is presented.

This source is rejected. ■

REVIEW and Remember

1. What is the definition of שלא לשמן?
2. What is the source that one may not throw the blood of an Olah not for its own sake just because it was slaughtered not for its own sake?
3. What was Rava's first question that excited Ravina?
4. What are the six things for which a Korban is offered?

Distinctive INSIGHT

Is intent a function of speech or thought?

שלא לשמן

The Mishnah teaches that if an offering is brought without its being for the proper purpose, the offering is valid, but it does not provide atonement for its owner. We are referring to the moment the animal is slaughtered (שחיטה), and we monitor the intent of the one who does the shechita for an offering other than the type which was supposed to be done. The Gemara (2b) adds that if the shechita was done without any specific intention at all (סתם), the offering is valid and its owner achieves atonement. This is true even if the animal was slaughtered without intention for an offering, but for regular consumption (חולין).

The Rishonim discuss whether the term "מחשבה" refers to thought alone, or whether an offering only becomes affected if the one slaughtering the animal verbalizes his intent and speaks out his misdirection of the purpose of this animal's being offered.

In several places, Rashi writes (41b; Pesachim 63a) that invalid "thought" in reference to offerings refers to verbal statements, where the one slaughtering the animal declares that his intention in bringing the animal is for an offering other than the one prescribed. The reason the Gemara uses the term "thought" rather than "speech" in order to teach that even without action, speech is enough to cause this effect and the damage can be done.

Rambam (according to Mishneh L'Melech, Hilchos P'sulei HaMukdashim 13:1) and Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 144) contend that improper thought alone, without its being verbalized, have the effect of ruining the intent necessary for an offering. This difference of opinion regarding the definition of "intent" has a significant application regarding areas where intent is needed for various mitzvos. Examples are the writing of a sefer Torah, mezuzos or tefillin, or writing a גט or processing the parchment for use for a sefer Torah. In each of these cases, it is essential that the items or the writing be infused with the proper intent for the mitzvah, and the issue would be whether the person must actually verbalize and declare that he is doing so for the mitzvah, or whether it is adequate for the person to simply have in mind

HALACHAH Highlight

Incorrect intent when offering a korban

כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כשרים אלא שלא עלו לבעלים

All korbanos that are offered not for their own sake are acceptable but their owner did not discharge his obligation

The Mishnah refers to korbanos that are offered **שלא לשמן**—lit. “not for their own sake.” This phrase encompasses two different disqualifications. One disqualification is when the kohen has in mind a different type of korban than designated (**שינוי קודש**). For example, if one slaughtered a Korban Olah with the intention that he is offering a Korban Shelamim. The second disqualification is when the kohen has in mind someone other than the actual owner of the korban. In the Gemara’s terminology this is referred to as **שינוי בעלים**—lit. a change of owner. In both cases the Mishnah rules that other than a couple of exceptions the korban is acceptable (**כשר**) but the owner has not discharged his obligation.

Tosafos¹ asserts that even though the Mishnah groups these two disqualifications into one phrase there is a fundamental difference between them. The incorrect thought that relates to the designation of the korban applies to all four of the blood services. Therefore, if while slaughtering, receiving the blood, transporting the blood or throwing the blood the kohen had in mind that he was working with a Korban Shelamim rather than a Korban Olah the korban is

(Insight...continued from page 1)

that this is his intent. Minchas Chinuch notes that even if thought alone has significance regarding offerings, according to the view that lashes are given for the one who ruins the offering, the lashes would only be administered where the intent was actually spoken.

The **גרי"ז** writes that when intent is needed, thought alone is adequate. Where an improper thought might ruin an offering, the improper intent only has its effect if the intent is spoken. ■

acceptable but the owner does not discharge his obligation. In contrast, the disqualification that results from having in mind someone other than the owner applies only when the blood is thrown on the altar since that is the service that provides the owner with atonement. Although the Gemara cites sources that having the wrong person in mind is a disqualification when performing all four blood services those expositions refer to where the kohen had in mind, for example, to slaughter this korban and throw the blood for Shimon rather than Reuven. Rambam² disagrees and he maintains that the disqualification of having the wrong person in mind applies to all of the four blood services. Therefore, if the kohen had in mind to slaughter a korban for Shimon rather than Reuven, the owner, the korban is acceptable but neither Reuven nor Shimon fulfilled his obligation. ■

1. תוס' ד"ה כל הזבחים.

2. רמב"ם פט"ו מהל' פסולי המוקדשין ה"א. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

The Order of Zevachim

”כל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן...”

“Learning kodoshim is different than learning any other part of Shas,” says the Tzon Kedoshim, zt”l.

He learns this from the order of the mishnayos in our mesechta. “It is surely very interesting that the mishnayos in Maseches Zevachim begin with the laws of lishmah and only first discusses teaching where the sacrifice is slaughtered in the fifth chapter.

“This teaches that kodoshim is different than any other seder. Although

everyone knows that one should always learn even not lishmah since **מתוך שלא לשמה**, this rule is less applicable to learning kodoshim, which counts like bringing a sacrifice. Just as a sacrifice does not discharge its owner of his obligation if it is brought shelo lishmah, learning kodoshim is the same. If we do not learn kodoshim lishmah we lose out on the merit of bringing all the sacrifices, since a sacrifice must be brought for the sake of the mitzvah.”¹

Although many believe that seder kodoshim should only be learned after one is an advanced scholar who has learned everything else in depth, the Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel ar-

gue on this approach, since without learning seder kodoshim one cannot understand seder nezikin in depth.

They learn this from the Gemara in Bava Metzia 109. There we find that when Rav Achah brei d’Rav Yosef asked Rav Ashi a question he replied, “When you reach shechitas kodoshim come back and ask me this question.”

The Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel learn from here that one should not ask questions in nezikin until he has learned all of Shas, including kodoshim.² ■

1. הקדמה לספר צאן קדשים

2. רמב"ן ורבינו חננאל בב"מ, דף ק"ט ע"ב