

OVERVIEW of the Daf

1) Attachments of korbanos (cont.)

Rava asks whether there is liability if one offers outside of the Beis HaMikdash the head of a pigeon that is not the volume of an olive but the salt brings it up to the volume of an olive.

The Gemara explains how this question is relevant for R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish who argued about one who offers a korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash that is less than an olive's volume but the bone brings it up to the volume of an olive.

2) R' Yosi HaGalili

A Baraisa is cited that records how different Tannaim responded on behalf of R' Yosi HaGalili to the challenge presented against him by Chachamim.

Zeiri identifies the difference between the two responses.

3) Eating a tamei korban while tamei

The Gemara notes that Rabanan seemed to have responded to R' Yosi HaGalili correctly and thereby refuting R' Yosi HaGalili's position concerning a tamei person who are a tamei korban.

Rava explains the exact point of dispute between Rabanan and R' Yosi HaGalili.

Rava's explanation of R' Yosi HaGalili is unsuccessfully challenged.

4) MISHNAH: The Mishnah begins with a comparison of the relative stringencies of slaughtering and offering korbanos outside of the Beis HaMikdash. R' Yosi and R' Shimon disagree about the extent of liability for one who offers the same korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash multiple times and whether liability is only when the korban reaches the top of the altar.

5) Clarifying the Mishnah

The Gemara asks why the Mishnah stated that there is a difference between offering a korban for the consumption of a person and slaughtering a korban for the consumption of a person.

The issue is analyzed until the difference is identified.

6) Two people offering a korban

A Baraisa records the dispute between R' Shimon and R' Yosi whether two people who offer a korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash are liable.

The exchange between them concerning their respective expositions is recorded.

7) Offering the same korban multiple times

Reish Lakish offers one explanation for the dispute between R' Shimon and R' Yosi whether one is liable for offering the same korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash multiple times.

R' Yochanan suggests a different explanation of the dispute.

Two versions of Ulla's position on the matter are recorded.

It is noted that Ulla's statement is at odds with a statement of the father of Shmuel.

8) Offering on a rock

R' Huna explains R' Yosi's position that one is liable only when the korban is offered on a rock.

R' Yochanan explains the rationale behind R' Shimon's position.

The exchange between the two opinions is recorded.

An alternative explanation for R' Shimon is offered based on a

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Distinctive INSIGHT

The prohibition is for a full animal, not for limbs

אמר ריש לקיש מחלוקת בד' וה' אברים, דמר סבר כתיב לעשות אותו, על השלם הוא חייב ואינו חייב על החסר וכו'

The Mishnah taught that if someone inadvertently offers a limb of an animal on an altar outside the courtyard of the Mikdash, and after realizing it he again offers another limb from that same animal in the same manner, R' Shimon rules that he must bring a chattas for each and every act. R' Yose holds that the many acts of offering parts of the animal only result in an obligation to bring one chattas.

In the Gemara, Reish Lakish explains the reasons for these opinions. When the Torah says not to bring an animal outside the courtyard of the Mikdash, it warns against not "bringing it—לעשות אותו." R' Yose holds that "it" refers to an entire animal, and not just a part of an animal. Therefore, if someone brought four or five pieces, and these make up the entire animal (Zevach Todah), or if these are the final four or five pieces which complete the bringing of the entire animal (Chazone Ish), he is liable for one chattas. R' Shimon holds that when the verse uses the term "אותו—it," this refers to each limb. Therefore, if someone offered four or five limbs, he would be liable for each and every limb. If however, the person brought many pieces of one limb in stages, provided that this is the final limb to complete the entire animal's being brought, all opinions would agree that he is liable for only one chattas.

R' Yochanan explains the disagreement between R' Yose and R' Shimon in the Mishnah in a different manner. He says that everyone agrees that if an animal was slaughtered outside the courtyard of the Mikdash, all opinions agree that offering a full limb is liable for a chattas, and if less than a full limb of an animal is brought, there is no chattas to be brought. This is learned from the exclusion from the word "אותו—it." The disagreement is in a case where an animal was slaughtered properly in the courtyard of the Mikdash, and a full limb was taken outside to be offered in many pieces. R' Shimon says the one who brings this offering is liable for

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REVIEW and Remember

1. What were the responses offered by Rebbi and R' Elazar the son of R' Shimon in defense of R' Yosi HaGalili?
2. In what way is slaughtering a korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash more stringent than offering a korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash?
3. Are two people who together offer a korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash liable?
4. What was unique about Manoach's korban?

HALACHAH Highlight

Two people moving a muktza object

One person is liable but not two

The Gemara Shabbos (3a) teaches that only when an individual violates a prohibition is there liability but if two people violate a prohibition together they are exempt if each of them could have violated that prohibition by himself. Commentators question whether the Gemara teaches that two people who violate a prohibition are merely exempt from bringing a korban or are they exempt from Biblical liability altogether and have violated only a Rabbinic prohibition. Sefer Mikor Chaim¹ contends that the Gemara's statement represents an exemption from liability to bring a korban but each person has nonetheless violated a Biblical prohibition. His rationale is based on the fact that the pasuk cited as proof to this principle is not used as an exemption when two people violate any other Torah prohibitions. For example, our Gemara discusses the prohibition against slaughtering a korban outside of the Beis HaMikdash. The Gemara teaches that if two people hold a knife and slaughter the korban they are exempt. The exemption is derived from a pasuk that appears in the context of korbanos. Why didn't the Gemara cite the same verse from the Gemara in Shabbos? It must be, concluded Mikor Chaim, that the verse cited in Shabbos is only an exemption from bringing a korban but the prohibition is still violated. For this reason it is necessary for our Gemara to cite another verse to prove that there is no prohibition. Other authorities², however, maintain that the exemption is from Biblical liability altogether.

אחד ולא שנים

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a chattas for each piece, as the exclusion of "it," which excludes a part of a piece does not apply to an animal slaughtered inside the courtyard. R' Yose holds that the exclusion applies to animals slaughtered in the courtyard as well as to those outside the courtyard, so the one who brings four or five pieces of one limb is only liable for one chattas.

Tosafos explains that one is not liable for offering part of an animal only where the remainder has been lost or destroyed. However, if the animal is intact somewhere, one would be in violation of this halacha even if he offers a k'zayis of the animal. Reish Lakish understands that R' Yose and R' Shimon disagree about how much of the animal must be lost before it is considered to be incomplete. ■

Rav Meir Arik³ asserts that this dispute finds expression when considering the question of whether it is permitted for two people to move an object that is muktza. According to those who maintain that when two people violate a prohibition they did not violate a Biblical prohibition one could say that two people are permitted to move a muktza object. Just as moving a muktza object with one's leg is permitted, since it does not involve a Biblical prohibition, so too since when two people violate a prohibition it does not constitute a Biblical violation and thus permitted. According to Mikor Chaim, however, since a violation transgressed by two people is a Biblical violation it would not be permitted for two people to move a muktza object. ■

1. סוף ספר מקור חיים הגהות על שו"ע סי' רס"ו במג"א סק"ז.
2. ע"י שו"ת באר יצחק או"ח סי' י"ד ושו"ת מנחת שלתמה ח"ב סי' כ"ט.
3. הערות שנדפסו בסוף ספר אשל אברהם. ■

STORIES Off the Daf

Partners in Torah

"לשנים שהעלו באבר שחייב..."

On today's daf we find that if even one limb of a sacrifice was brought up on an altar outside the sanctuary by two people together, both are liable for punishment. Yet the Chofetz Chaim, zt"l, writes that the same is true for the good; when someone uplifts the honor of the Torah by supporting Torah scholars, both parties profit equally.

When someone wondered whether it was worth it to make a Yissachar and Zevulun agreement and asked Rav Shach, zt"l, he found that the rav was in favor.

Rav Shach answered, "You lose nothing by making such an arrangement. Therefore, even if you are supporting yourself on your own, you should still sign this agreement, since the extra money will enable you to learn better since you will have less pressure from money, which leads to more mental clarity.

He added, "You need not worry about losing a portion of your eternal reward in the next world, since the reward of Torah in the next world is eternal and cannot be diminished by sharing it with another."

To another student Rav Shach explained, "When it comes to making such an agreement we can apply the dictum of our sages, **זה נהנה** — This one gains and the other loses nothing by it."¹

Rav Shach would also encourage laymen to take the initiative to support Torah study. "When a person who supports those who study Torah leaves the physical world—even if he himself never learned anything—he will know all the Torah that was learned with his support. You must know that the greatest bliss will be afforded those who learned Torah and those who supported those who learned."

He added, "If you think about it you will understand that if one was able to pay to know a mishnah or chapter or even a complete tractate, he would surely be willing to pay anything he could afford—even in this world where we don't see the pristine great-

ness of Torah. How much more will this be true in the next world, where we will see the holiness and preciousness of every word of Torah. Surely, the one who gained the Torah will be thrilled with the Torah waiting for him, especially if he himself was unable to learn as is fitting.

"When a person thinks about this, he will surely race after those who learn to attain the merit of Torah. I am sure you will take these words—which emerge from the holy works of the Chofetz Chaim—to heart and merit all the wondrous reward of those who support Torah."² ■

1. לולי תורתך, ע"י תי"א
2. מכתבים ומאמרים להרב ש"ך, ח"ג, ע"י ע"ח

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Baraisa.

The Baraisa is clarified.

R' Yosi the son of R' Chanina inquires about whether the bamah must have characteristics of the altar for liability.

R' Yirmiyah cites a Baraisa that indicates that it is not essential. ■